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ABSTRACT 
 AUTHENTICITY AND ANIMAL WELFARE: UNDERSTANDING AND  
AMELIORATING THE SUFFERING OF DAIRY COWS AND THEIR CALVES 
 As Bernard Rollin discusses throughout his body of work, animals have interests and         
unique teloi as well as the capacity to feel pain and suffer emotionally. I argue that we must 
confront the ways in which we contribute to the suffering of dairy cows and their calves in 
particular, for their lives constitute a paradigmatic denial of an animal’s telos. Martin 
Heidegger’s notion of everydayness and his concept of authenticity—and especially Charles B. 
Guignon’s interpretations of them—allow us to understand and come to terms with our own 
everyday contribution to the reprehensible practices surrounding dairy production. That is, 
Heidegger’s understanding of Being allows us to see that we are likely contributors to the 
perpetuation of dairy cow and calf suffering. The concept of authenticity also acts as a tool that 
allows us insight into describing and prescribing personal commitments that entail the 
amelioration of these animals’ suffering. The goal is to individually strive to improve animal 
welfare in the dairy industry, which entails taking responsibility for and altering our actions and 
choices; otherwise, to avoid doing so is culpable—a notion akin to Nancy Williams’s argument 
that we are affectively ignorant of our role in animal mistreatment. Finally, utilizing authenticity 
as a guide also allows us to look to history, idols, and exemplars for moral guidance.
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 Notions concerning the “good life” and what it means to “live well” have pervaded 
hundreds of years of philosophy. Attempting to encapsulate and describe the good life, one may 
consult robust philosophical notions of happiness and freedom, or one might consider more 
familiar attributes of life such as education, career choices, and lifestyle habits as constitutive of 
the primary paths toward living well. Alternatively, we can attempt to live well by advising 
ourselves with rationality and logical thinking, and try to live life according to a rigid calculus. 
The ways in which one can strive to achieve the good life are many and varied, and at the end of 
one’s life, one may still wonder if he or she made the right choices.
1
 In shedding light on one 
aspect of what it means to live well, I argue that living up to our own commitments to others—in 
this case, animals—is essential.  
1.1: Why living well means treating animals well 
 Surely, many people do a lot of good, whether it is through their professions, their 
voluntary actions, or random acts. Teachers not only educate children, but often create a sense of 
belonging and comfort for underprivileged or troubled children; doctors and nurses comfort 
people through difficult times including illness and death of their loved ones; others volunteer for 
organizations that contribute to finding cures for cancer, ending world hunger, eliminating 
poverty, etc.  
 Though there is a vast array of components that constitute what it means to either live 
well or not, the moral problem of animal welfare pervades more aspects of our lives than we 
imagine, and we must take great care to recognize this. Animal suffering lurks in our bathrooms, 
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kitchens, medicine cabinets, clothing stores, supermarkets, movies and television programs—all 
while we watch and relax into enjoyment, comfort, or indifference. We eat their flesh and eggs; 
drink their milk; use their by-products to cure, cleanse, and clothe our bodies; utilize them for 
testing the safety of cosmetics, self-care products, medicines, and medical procedures; cast them 
in movies and keep them in circuses, rodeos, and zoos to entertain us; and house and feed them 
to comfort or aid us. 
 Knowing that we use animals for so many resources and knowing that they suffer in the 
production of those resources ought to raise a red flag in our moral purview: a majority of us 
probably agree that within our sets of values, there exists the belief that it is morally wrong or 
questionable to contribute to the needless harm of a being who can feel pain. Moreover, if we 
hold that belief and we also know that we are actively contributing to this pain, we believe that 
we might be failing morally, and therefore failing to live well, because our actions do not align 
with our values. Thus, a necessary component of achieving a good life is concerning ourselves 
with and attempting to ameliorate the needless suffering we cause, either directly or indirectly, to 
animals. 
1.2: The approach combining phenomenology and moral philosophy 
 In order to describe and best frame this relationship between our commitments and the 
wellbeing of animals, I will present the phenomenological concept of authenticity—particularly 
Martin Heidegger’s concept of authenticity—and illustrate how it allows us to grasp and reflect 
upon our misguided relation to our selves and to others, enables us to understand ourselves 
temporally, and fuels us with an overarching sense of responsibility and commitment to animals. 
Framing and understanding ourselves in this phenomenological sense also leads us to prescribe 
and understand how we ought to continue to live our lives once given this new context. With the 
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help of Bernard Rollin’s notion of “reminding” ourselves of our ethical beliefs and applying 
them to new moral categories (in this case, animals), Heidegger’s conception of authenticity 
allows us the advantage of being able to choose which roles, values, and traits we ought to 
cultivate if we are to live lives grounded by a strong sense of commitment and personal identity. 
Authenticity also serves as a tool and a guide when we face moral dilemmas and problems. 
Because Heidegger is notorious for his nearly impenetrable text, I aim to make his sophisticated 
notions more accessible, and therefore show that they are applicable, plausible, and practical—
not far-fetched as many might be rather inclined to believe. 
 Though phenomenology and moral philosophy can help us understand and attempt to 
solve various types of problems, I am especially concerned with the issue of animal welfare. 
Upon describing the issue and making a clear case for animal welfare constituting an urgent 
moral issue (and dairy animal welfare comprising such a particularly pressing concern in that 
arena) I identify inauthenticity as the problem and primary driver behind our individual 
contributions to the perpetuation of these animals’ suffering. Finally, I will reply to a series of 
objections concerning authenticity’s relationship with alienation, its potential excessive time 
requirement it poses for us moral agents, as well as its supposed impracticality. 
2: The animal problem: a brief history and defense for the fight to end animal suffering 
de Beauvoir: You’ve never liked animals. 
Sartre: Oh, but I have, to some extent. Dogs and cats. 
de Beauvoir: Not much. 
Sartre: Animals. As I see it they are a philosophical problem. Basically.
2
 
 The history of philosophy has proven that animals are a kind of philosophical mystery; 
philosophers have diminished animals, labeling them as mere tools for our own use, and idolized 
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them as if their lives were equal in value to that of humans. Despite Descartes' influential 
assertion that animals are mere machines without mental lives,
3
 three of Darwin's works, The 
Origin of Species, The Descent of Man, and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and 
Animals, allowed for the widespread recognition of man's difference in degree, not kind, with 
non-human animals.
4
 More particularly, states Bernard Rollin, Darwin's The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals “brazenly hoists a middle finger to the Cartesian tradition,” since 
Darwin believed emotion to be “inextricably bound up with subjective feelings.”
5
 Darwin also 
“affirmed that ‘there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher animals in their 




 Fairly recently, and rather past-due, in July 2012, the scientific community finally agreed 
that animals are conscious, 150 years after Darwin asserted such claims.
7
 This event, disguised 
as a so-called step forward in science, simply highlights the rather backward way of approaching 
evolutionary theory: if human physical processes can be applied throughout the phylogenetic 
scale, why are often corresponding mental processes (e.g., having feelings of anxiety, aggression, 
pleasure, boredom, etc.) conveniently left out of the analogy? Rollin answers: “The current 
ideology of biological science seems conveniently to forget . . . the dictum universally accepted 
among modern biologists that all biology must be structured within the framework of 
evolutionary theory.”
8
 This convenience has, in part, allowed those involved in animal industries 
to do with animals whatever they please.  
 This included furthering our understanding of animal behavior, though its purview was 
limited, and not in favor of animals. In the mid-1900s, behaviorism became the primary 
approach to animal psychology, and remained so for about fifty years.
9
 However, researchers 
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continued to deny animal subjects this mental experience. Rollin cites researcher Clark Hull, 
who argued that talk of “consciousness” ought to be banned from the scope of psychological 
research: “To guard against the danger of ‘anthropomorphic subjectivism,’ we must ‘regard . . . 
the behaving organism as a completely self-maintaining robot, constructed of materials as unlike 
ourselves as may be.’”
10
 Not surprisingly, much of the research that took place during this era 
was largely restricted to conditioning and learning, whereas research into other realms of animal 
behavior, including sensory capacity, general habits, and reproductive, feeding, emotional, and 
social behavior, was of secondary importance.
11
 
 The current atmosphere of ethical animal treatment has been greatly influenced by both 
our history of utilizing animals in such research and our convenient denial of consciousness and 
associated mental states. In no other place can this fact—that history has influenced the current 
lack of animal welfare standards—be quite as clear as it is in our current agricultural practices, 
especially that of dairy. 
2.1: Understanding the animal problem: telos and animal behavior 
 In order to better place animals within our moral purview, Rollin takes the Aristotelian 
concept of telos
12
 and applies it to the realm of animal ethics, illustrating that we have an 
obligation to animals essentially because they have unique interests. That is, a cat does what he 
does in virtue of him being a cat and having interests of none other than a cat; the same principle 
applies to all animals: cows, pigs, dogs, birds, octopuses, hamsters, etc. “With Aristotle, we may 
speak of a particular telos for each sort of living thing, a nature that sets it apart from other 
things. This nature is defined by the functions and aims (not necessarily conscious aims) of the 
creature in question. So, in a real sense, a thing is what is does.”
13
 Rollin goes on to describe that 
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telos can be fundamentally considered a morally-driven notion, since it allows us to understand a 
being in terms of what its unique needs or interests are: 
Though [the concept of telos] is partially metaphysical (in defining a way of looking 
at the world), and partially empirical (in that it can and will be deepened and refined 
by increasing empirical knowledge), it is at root a moral notion . . . because it 
contains the notion of what about an animal we ought to at least try to respect and 
accommodate . . . If an animal has a set of needs and interests which are constitutive 
of its nature, then, in our dealings with that animal, we are obligated to not violate 
and to attempt to accommodate those interests, for the violation of and failure to 




 This characterization of animals as individuals who not only have interests but also have 
interests that matter to them is the philosophical bedrock for my assertion that we ought to 
extend moral obligations to animals. Though it would be difficult to draw a line as to precisely 
which animal species or their individual members could possess the ability to have a life that 
matters to them, there do exist rather stark characteristics among certain species of animals that 
make it clear that some are cognizant of their own lives and others around them, and are able to 
suffer both physiologically and psychologically if their needs are not met and their basic interests 
violated. Consider the following attributes of sea mammals: 
[L]ove is sometimes displayed most dramatically when a child is in trouble; 
mothers of many species will fight to the death to protect their offspring, and when 
a child is hurt or killed, they exhibit the deepest feelings of grief and pain. Sea lion 
mothers, watching the babies being eaten by killer whales, squeal eerily and wail 
pitifully in anguish over their loss, and dolphins have been observed struggling to 
save a dead infant. Mother love is found in innumerable species . . . Killer whales, 





 Not surprisingly, many animals are equally capable of having the same physical pains 
and emotions as humans, and therefore, according to Rollin’s model, similar teloi. And, 
unfortunately, these animals are often the ones we use as tools in various everyday practices. I 
will now briefly discuss these kinds of physical and psychological phenomena that occur in the 
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life of a particular type of animal, and the context in which it occurs, thus illustrating our 
disrespect for their unique teloi. In particular, I will focus on the cows in the dairy industry, and 
will first justify this selection. 
3: The justification for focusing on the dairy industry 
 The justification for focusing on the dairy industry is twofold: first, it makes for an 
exceptionally pressing issue because in terms of a cow’s telos, many current practices prohibit 
the cow and calf’s natural tendencies. We intervene between a mother and her newborn, take 
what is supposed to exclusively belong to the calf (her milk), and separate the pair for the rest of 
their lives, refusing the mother to allow her to do what she is supposed to do: nurture her baby—
what Rollin refers to as a paradigmatic example of cruelty.
16
 Moreover, we artificially 
inseminate them, milk them utilizing machines, house them in less than preferable environments 
and force them into confinement, e.g., on concrete (when their bodies are not built for these 
surfaces),
17
 thus refusing them the space and pasture they use for social interaction, play, 
comfort, etc. In addition, several practices are performed throughout dairies in the United States, 
including tail-docking, a procedure in which the cow’s tail is removed,
18
 dehorning, continuous 
impregnation, and more. 
 Second, society and its everyday routines have engrained in us a notion that the milk we 
consume originates from a nurturing act; producing and giving milk is one of the most 
wholesome features of a mother’s care and love. Hence, surrounding the consumption of milk 
(and other dairy products, but to a lesser extent) there are very few negative connotations.
19
 This 
rather blind acceptance of the fact that wholesomeness is part of the dairy cow’s life is an 
archetypical example of how we, as individuals, live our daily lives without questioning both the 
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origin of the products that we consume and the negative effects we have on the emotionally and 
physiologically complex animals that supply us with those products. 
3.1: A note about the term “factory” farming 
 Though there are many ways to characterize what exactly a “factory” farm is, I generally 
mean it to encapsulate this view: namely, that a factory farm is one where the economic goals 
outstrip the observed standards of the animals’ welfare such that the animals’ teloi are 
compromised to varying degrees. This purposefully vague definition can allow for a number of 
different settings to meet the standard of a factory farm; in this way, then, farms that have a 
varying number of cows (or pigs, chickens, etc.) from even dozens to the hundreds and 
thousands can qualify as factory farms if the animals are confined in such a way that they are, for 
example, unable to move, lie down, or receive adequate nutrition. Though the number of animals 
in a single location is of great concern, I believe that if the profit and efficiency are of primary 
importance at some severe expense of the animals’ welfare, then such a practice may be 
categorized under the umbrella of the term “factory” farming. This does not necessarily exclude 
family farms, for family farms can indeed house or treat animals in such ways that would not 
meet certain standards for animal welfare (e.g., the notable standards of the CROPP 
Cooperative).
20
 The debate of this term and of related terms (i.e., condensed animal feeding 
operations, or CAFOs) is also apt to change as practices change. What is at stake in the here and 
now, however, is not the importance of the precise term I use, but rather, of the message that I 
deliver concerning the individual lives of the animals who are in peril. Nonetheless, with that 




3.2: The sheer number of animals utilized in agriculture makes it a great concern 
 In order to grasp the scope of the use of animals in agriculture, and particularly the dairy 
industry, it is indeed helpful to understand how many animals are utilized for their meat as well 
as their by-products. Singer states that the “use and abuse of animals raised for food far exceeds, 
in sheer numbers of animals affected, any other kind of mistreatment.”
21
 An estimated 95% of all 
animal use is for agricultural purposes, and these animals are raised as quickly and as cheaply as 
possible to meet economic demands.
22
 
 Animal scientist Jonathan Balcombe, while lecturing in 2011 regarding current animal 
treatment, shows his concern for the rate of production and consumption in the United States: 
 [An] estimated nine to ten billion [animals] in the United States per year are caught 
up in the factory farming system so that we can buy cheap [products] . . .  [O]n veal 
farms, we deprive calves of their mothers and mothers of their calves, so that we 
can have cheap milk, and the reward for the mother at the end of about four or five 
cycles of artificial insemination and having her baby taken away from her on day 
one is to be sent to the slaughterhouse. What's wrong with this? The crux of it is 
that animals feel. They are sentient. They have the capacity for pain and they have 
the capacity for pleasure. They can feel suffering, extended suffering, and they can 
experience joy. The way I like to put it is: Sentience is the bedrock of ethics; the 
foundation of moral systems is that others matter—not just lives that matter to me, 




Balcombe and Rollin both point to the importance of the notion that animals are not doing what 
they want to be doing, or what it is their nature leads them to do; it is impossible, given their 
circumstances, to be able to fulfill their teloi. Because of the incredible numbers of dairy cows in 
the United States, it should go without saying that they, too, are caught up in a system in which 
cost effectiveness and efficiency play an important role. In particular, the number of dairy cows 
in the United States in 2014 reached about 9.3 million, who produced on average over 22,000 
pounds of milk each, and there is an upward trend of milk production per cow.
24
 In 1980, the 
dairy cow produced an average of under 12,000 pounds of milk each year.
25
 And in the year 
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2000, the average American consumed 593 pounds of dairy products (milk, butter, yogurt, 
cheese, and frozen dairy products like ice cream).
26
 
4: The dairy industry 
 As I previewed, the image of the dairy industry and the reality of its operations make for 
an interesting and complex moral issue for several reasons. Drinking milk carries with it notions 
of motherly love, comfort, wellbeing—wholesome ideas that have naturally taken a strong 
foothold, for seemingly nothing can top a parent’s love and comfort. Even when I personally first 
began experimenting with vegetarianism as a diet and lifestyle, I continued to consume milk and 
eat cheese, as my mother cared for my health, urging me that calcium intake was essential for my 
growing bones. Not surprisingly, and like perhaps many others, I never questioned milk; after all, 
I thought, the animal was not being slaughtered for her meat; she was, rather, living out her life. 
 This ignorance of the life of a dairy cow is due in part to the fact that the media has 
portrayed dairy cows as hearty, beautiful female animals, providing life for their calves and 
aiding in our own offspring’s health: as Rollin remarks, “The image of ‘Bessy’ happily chewing 
her cud” has symbolized the dairy industry, as we take comfort in “the pastoral picture of 
‘contented cows.’”
27
 In The Ethics of What We Eat, Peter Singer and Jim Mason state: “Milk and 
cheese production enjoy a better reputation than other forms of intensive farming, and the dairy 
industry is keen to keep it that way.”
28
 The image of Bessy on the pasture, the idea that she feeds 
her calf her milk (and that we get the rest), and the notion that cows blankly chew their cud 
without thinking about much else are misconceptions: apart from having intense emotional lives, 
cows even “get excited when they solve intellectual challenges.”
29
 Donald Broom, professor of 
animal welfare at Cambridge University, presented cows with a problem and upon being solved, 




 Marc Bekoff, Professor Emeritus of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology at the 
University of Colorado, also comments on cow behavior, particularly regarding emotions with 
which humans are familiar, including pain, fear, and anxiety: 
 Studies show that [cows] worry about their future. They and other agricultural 
animals make and miss their friends. Veterinarian John Webster and his colleagues 
have shown how cows within a herd form smaller friendship groups of between 
two to four animals with whom they spend most of their time, often grooming and 
licking each other. They also dislike other cows and can bear grudges for months 
or years. There's no doubt that cows and other farm animals are sentient beings who 




4.1: Cow and calf welfare 
 In dairy farms across the United States, cows are vastly not reared, housed, or treated in 
such ways as to promote the intellectual stimulation or social interaction that Broom and Bekoff 
describe above. Generally, cows are kept indoors, with the main goal of yielding as much 
product as possible. Singer writes: “The modern dairy cow has been bred to produce as much 
milk as possible and now produces more than three times as much milk as a typical dairy cow 
did fifty years ago.”
32
 Some dairy farmers also give their cows injections of BST (bovine 
somatotrophin, a genetically engineered growth hormone, now banned in Canada and the 
European Union) that allows for a fourteen to twenty percent increase in milk production.
33
 This 
over-production of milk results in “considerable stress” on the cow’s body, and moreover, the 
BST injection site becomes tender and swollen.
34
 
 Cows are also artificially inseminated in order to birth a calf (approximately annually) to 
sustain their milk production.
35
 The calf does not usually consume his or her own mother’s milk; 
instead, the calf is often immediately taken away so he or she can be used for other purposes (if 
the calf is male, he would be used for veal production, and most female calves replace other 
dairy cows).
36
 Singer cites Professor John Webster of the department of animal husbandry at the 
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University of Bristol: “The calf born to the dairy cow is routinely submitted to more insults to 
normal development than any other farm animal. It is taken from its mother shortly after birth, 
deprived of its natural food, whole cow’s milk, and fed one of a variety of cheaper liquid 
substitutes.”
37
 Nothing could hardly be as in opposition to an animal’s telos as forcing an icon of 
nourishment, the cow, to birth a calf, and deny the calf its own mother’s milk. 
 In my personal experience on a visit to a dairy farm located in Colorado, I arrived upon a 
field of rows of calves, individually chained to their plastic housing units which contained some 
bedding, food, and water. Upon greeting the first calf, she immediately began nudging my 
fingers with her nose and mouth, and started suckling on them with great intensity as if they were 
her mother’s udder. When she stopped, she would jump and dash as far as the chain would allow 
her, greeting others in the group, vibrantly illustrating how much excitement she was 
experiencing upon contact with another being. In fact, she was more dog-like than some dogs I 
have met: she continually wanted to sniff, jump, explore, and run. She was positively vivacious, 
and was causing a joyous stir in the other calves around her. When the group of students I was 
with and I left her vicinity, the slack in her tether was gone, as she had moved as far as she could 
go toward our direction, and keeping attentive eyes on us, curled up on the ground, about as 
motionless as the other several dozens of calves there. Ahead of her was the life one hundred 
yards away: sitting on concrete or dirt all day, being herded into room where a machine would 
take her milk once she, too, birthed a calf. Upon leaving that farm, I left feeling disturbed, 
thinking about her bleak future of boredom and confinement, unable to freely graze a pasture and 
one day feed her own calf. Upon returning home, I sat with my dog for a long time, pondering 
the few differences between her and the calf. This dairy, Rollin remarked, was one of the better 
ones. 
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 Indeed, considering the fact that the “hutches” the calves are kept in allow them some 
amount of social interaction with the other calves around them (depending on the length of the 
tether), it is better than keeping them in crates.
38
 However, Rollin cites Ronald Kilgour and Clive 
Dalton’s view (based upon the work of H. H. Sambraus, former professor of animal husbandry 
and behavioral sciences at the Technical University of Munich, Germany) that calves do better 
when they are reared in groups, which ensures “appropriate resting behavior, social and activity 
behavior.”
39
 Moreover, the “calf’s surroundings should provide plenty of stimuli to allow 
exploration and play”; otherwise, calves raised without such interaction leads to a “failure to 
develop normal social behavior.”
40
 In my own experience, as much as I enjoyed meeting the calf, 
seeing her restrained by a chain to her hutch was disturbing, especially considering the growing 
research on animal play and boredom.
41
 Many pet owners (including me) would never keep their 
own pets tied up day in and day out—in fact, we often have them sleep near us, or have them sit 
on our laps, and some people even take them to their workplace so as to prevent them from being 
bored and alone. To see such desperate excitement in a young animal, whether it is a dog, cat, or 
a calf, gives one the unsettling feeling that something is amiss. Again, Rollin interprets this as 
the calf’s telos being inadequately fulfilled—she cannot do what her nature, as a calf, urges her 
to do: be close to her mother, interact playfully with other calves, explore, run, and even jump. 
 If on a range, cows, though not typically viewed as very active, will in fact walk more 
than six thousand meters a day; cows who are tied to hutches or who are in confined areas are 
obviously constricted to fence posts and tethers, disallowing the ability to exercise, explore, or be 
stimulated.
42
 In particular, tie stalls keep the cow tethered for extended periods of time, causing 
them to be unable to groom, interact with one another, and move.
43
 However, there are a number 
of benefits and concerns with these various types of housing, as Rollin discusses in his 
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illuminating book Farm Animal Welfare: a cow’s social tendencies are inhibited in confinement, 
but if left out on dry lots (dirt pens), “lack of shelter from wind and snow, poor drainage, and 
general protection from climatic extremes” become concerns.
44
  
 Moreover, flooring is an important consideration, as cement, for example, can cause foot 
and leg issues.
45
 Even pasturing cows (think of the images we see of “happy cows” chewing 
grass with the sun on their backs) raises its own issues, since lack of shade, insects, extreme 
temperatures, distance to drinking water, etc., constitute problems for the wellbeing of the 
cows.
46
 As Rollin states, more research must be done to continue to learn what is best for cow 
behavior while still meeting product demands, and most importantly, the “elimination of total 
confinement systems such as tie stalls” ought to be a priority.
47
 
4.2: Calves and veal 
 The veal industry is an appendage to dairies, and carries out equally problematic and 
disturbing practices. While waiting in line to order a McDonald’s hamburger one day, Peter 
Lovenheim, a writer from Rochester, New York, decided he wanted to know where the meat 
originated.
48
 In his book entitled Portrait of a Burger as a Young Calf,
49
 he tells the story of his 
visit to a local farm, Lawnel Farms. There, he witnessed the methods of meat and dairy 
production, where one mother’s calf was taken away from her forty minutes after she gave birth, 
when she had already started to lick the calf. When a farmhand took her newborn away, she 
began to sniff the straw where the calf had been; she bellowed, and paced. Even hours later, she 
“began sticking her nose under the gate to the barn in which she was confined, bellowing 
continuously.”
50
 While this was occurring, her calf was “in another part of the farm, lying 
shivering on a concrete floor,” and within a few days, he died, and “his body was laying on the 
farm's compost pile.”
51
 The mother’s behavior, as Temple Grandin, professor of Animal 
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Sciences at Colorado State University, notes, is the behavior of a cow who is stressed: “She 
wants her baby. Bellowing for it, hunting for it. She’ll forget for a while, then start again. It’s 




 When male calves are born to their mothers on dairy farms, as mentioned earlier, they 
either are utilized in veal production or the alternative is to immediately slaughter them
53
 
(though, as in the example above, it is not always the case, as the calf unfortunately died after 
suffering for a period of days). As Singer and Mason write, the fate of the slaughtered calf is 
better than that of the calf who spends four months in “confinement in semi-darkness, in a bare 
wooden crate too narrow to turn around. He will be tied at the neck, further restricting his 
movements” which cause his muscles to develop, making for tougher veal (as opposed to the 
“soft texture” that consumers desire in “prime veal”).
54
 Additionally, if the calves are transported 
to be auctioned for other purposes, they undergo an intense bout of stress during transportation, 
often before they are even unable to walk. As Temple Grandin states, the “[w]orst thing you can 
do is put a bawling baby on a trailer. It’s just an awful thing to do.”
55
 
 The natural life of the calf, however, includes a period of up to seven months of suckling, 
during which the mother and the calf bond strengthens.
56
 In order to produce both milk and veal 
efficiently, the mother and calf are separated, causing trauma to both. Rollin cites the work of  
J. L. Albright, Professor Emeritus of Animal Science at Purdue University: “When the calf is left 
with the cow three days or more, it is more difficult to separate the pair. Excessive bawling, 
fussing, and breaking down fences occur when maternal urges are then denied.”
57
 Rollin believes 
that, considering the “sanctity of the mother-offspring relationship,” research is needed on how 
to ameliorate the immense stress that this causes on the pair.
58
 Singer and Mason quote John 
 16 
Avizienius, senior scientific officer in the Farm Animals Department of the RSPCA of Britain, 
who says that: 
 [he] remembers one particular cow who appeared to be deeply affected by the 
separation of her calf for a period of at least six weeks. When the calf was first 
removed, she was in acute grief; she stood outside the pen where she had last seen 
her calf and bellowed for her offspring for hours . . . Even after six weeks, the 
mother would gaze at the pen where she last saw her calf and sometime wait 
momentarily outside the pen. It was almost as if her spirit had been broken and all 




For some, these kinds of illustrations of the industry do not point to investing in research in order 
to improve problems; rather, the relationship between the cow and her calf (and public views 
about it) is causing organizations like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, The Farm 
Sanctuary, and Mercy for Animals to urge people to stop eating veal and consuming dairy 
altogether, and to contact their legislators to ban veal crates. The Pew Commission on Industrial 
Farm Animal Production, constituted by veterinarians, professors, ranchers, and many 
accomplished others, also states that “[a]fter reviewing the literature, visiting production 
facilities, and listening to producers themselves,” crates such as these, as well as those utilized to 
contain other animals are inhumane: “[T]he Commission believes that the most intensive 
confinement systems, such as restrictive veal crates . . . prevent the animal from a normal range 
of movement and constitute inhumane treatment.”
60
 
4.3: Downer cattle 
 The aforementioned organizations like PETA and Mercy for Animals also widely 
publicize videos of inhumanely treated animals such as “downer” cattle. One such video released 
in 2008 by the Humane Society of the United States shows the downer cattle—animals who 
essentially cannot get up due to injury or sickness such as very low levels of calcium or “milk 
fever”
61
—being abused and brutally forced to get up and move to slaughter. In the video, 
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workers kick the cows, ram them with “blades of a forklift, ja[b] them in the eyes, appl[y] 
painful electrical shocks and even tortur[e] them with a hose and water.”
62
 Wayne Pacelle, 
president and CEO of the Humane Society of the United States, comments on the video: “This 
torture is right out of the waterboarding manual. To see the extreme cruelties shown in The 
HSUS video challenges comprehension.”
63
  
 The best solution for these cases, both for animal and human safety, is for the animal to 
be immediately killed
64
 and never to be introduced into the food supply.
65
 Colorado State 
University’s 2008 study entitled, “Survey of Dairy Management Practices on One Hundred 
Thirteen North Central and Northeastern United States Dairies,” found that for downer cattle in 
those regions, the “preferred euthanasia method” of eighty-six percent of dairy owners was the 
use of a gun, because it is perceived as the easiest method that also causes the least amount of 
suffering.
66
 However, injections utilizing disinfectants, because lack of availability of euthanasia 
solutions, were also sometimes used, which is not approved by the American Veterinary Medical 
Association (AVMA) because the injection of a disinfectant into the bloodstream is quite painful 
in virtue of its lack of anesthetic properties.
67
 
4.4: Tail-docking and dehorning 
 An additional exploration of the dairy industry illustrates yet another denial of one of the 
cow’s natural tendencies—swatting insects with her tail, or simply having a tail. It should go 
without saying that cows have tails for a reason, and it seems to fly in the face of common sense 
to remove a body part that serves a particular purpose for that animal. However, tail removal, or 
“tail-docking” is commonly practiced throughout the United States and Canada (and not only in 




 Besides worker discomfort from tail-striking, it is believed that removing or shortening 
the tail increases cleanliness and decreases the number of cases of mastitis (mentioned earlier) as 
well as somatic cell counts, a gauge for milk quality.
69
 The removal can be done in a few 
different ways, either through “banding, cauterizing docking irons, emasculators or surgical 
removal,” and all of these could potentially lead to infection.
70
 In particular, banding, or 
elastration, is a process that cuts off the blood supply over a period of time (between three to 
seven weeks) until the tail falls off.
71
 (One can get an idea of the incredible pain this would cause 
by simply leaving a very tight rubber band around one’s finger for a day.) Not only does the cow 
lose her ability to swat bothersome flies and insects, banding causes a great deal of suffering and 
can “cause infection, death, and decrease milk production.”
72
 Moreover, the same study out of 
Colorado State University shows that eighty-two percent of dairies in the Midwest practice tail-
docking, and the “most common reason given by producers for tail[-]docking was cow hygiene” 
(at seventy-three percent) despite the fact that, as Rollin states, his “conversations with dairy 
specialists, dairy veterinarians, and a lactation physiologist have convinced [him] that there is 
absolutely no scientific basis for claims about the benefits of tail-docking.”
73
 In fact, a pathogen 
called clostridia often results after tail-docking as well as gangrene, tetanus infections, and 
damage to the nerves in the tail, which lead to development of painful neuromas.
74
 Finally, tail-
docking research, such as a 2002 study out of the University of Wisconsin, shows that udder 
hygiene scores did not differ between cows with tails and cows with docked tails, and the 
National Mastitis Council has brought no evidence to bear on the alleged benefits of docking 
improving cow welfare, milk quality, or hygiene.
75
 
 Though docking is still common, the National Dairy Farmers Assuring Responsible 
Management (FARM) Animal Care Program disapproves of tail-docking, and “switch-trimming” 
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is recommended since it is much less painful and will still prevent matting of the tail hair with 
manure.
76
 However, if the consumer herself is opposed to the practice of tail-docking, as I will 
discuss, she ought to choose products that she can trust to avoid that practice. For example, 
Organic Valley, a group of farmer-owned dairies that is part of the Coulee Region Organic 
Produce Pool (CROPP) Cooperative, prohibits tail docking procedures, since removing the tail 




 Colorado State University’s 2008 survey also shows that de-horning is common as well, 
finding that about thirty-five percent of calves were dehorned by the age of eight weeks, and by 
twelve weeks, nearly eighty percent were dehorned.
78
 The methods of dehorning include hot iron 
(sixty-seven percent), gouging (nine percent), paste (ten percent), saw (about four percent), and 
otherwise unknown (about eleven percent).
79
 Only approximately twelve percent of dairy owners 
indicated that they used anesthetics in removal, and two percent reported utilizing analgesia.
80
 
The process of dehorning utilizing caustic chemicals as well as using a hot iron can cause pain 
because the horn button and horn’s interior contains nerves, even when the calf is very young.
81
 
There is also a quite simple for blocking the nerve to the horn in young calves in order to 
increase their comfort during and after the procedure.
82
  
 Despite the presence of horns being a safety issue for other cattle (especially in 
transportation), Rollin states: “When I talk to ranchers, I ask them to engage in a thought 
experiment: If tomorrow the law banned . . . dehorning . . . would they go out of business? Their 
answer is, ‘Of course not!’”
83
 Like the range of aforementioned practices, there is potential for 
raising standards for animal welfare in this aspect of the industry without risking economic 
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failure. This is illustrated by the notion that the more seemingly difficult element here is the 
adaptation that is required for transitioning from conventional practices to new ones. 
5: Dairy animal welfare on the individual level 
 If one remains unmoved by evidence of the reprehensible actions that occur on dairy 
farms, perhaps the fact that suppliers of animal products (such as milk) try to keep the details of 
their production under-wraps is a telltale sign that something wrong is happening behind the 
scenes; if it were not, companies would likely be willing to expose details of their operations to 
the public without fretting about the way they are perceived. (Consider, for example, the 
movement proposing legislation that would “criminalize whistleblowers” for exposing animal 
cruelty on factory farms.)
84
 Though it is generally easy to show and convince others that many of 
these means of production are morally wrong, it is nevertheless difficult to try to show people 
how their own actions contribute to this suffering. What we need to understand is that living well 
and living up to one’s own moral standards requires treating animals well. As I will argue, we 
must take responsibility in doing our part in reducing and preventing animal suffering, and 
improving dairies is an especially urgent and heart-wrenching issue.  
 Importantly, though, this is not a call for a mass transition into vegetarianism or 
veganism; rather, it is an urgent message concerning the fact that we owe these animals a balance 
between meeting the goals of production and fulfilling their nature, or their teloi. Though I never 
expect everyone to be (or argue that they should be) completely vegetarian or vegan, I do argue 
that we can and should make changes in order to make animals’ lives much better before we 
consume them and their by-products (if we are to do so at all). As I have discussed, we can make 
some of these changes with further research and new technologies
85




housing alternatives, etc. But as individuals and consumers, we can also make changes by 
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 This discussion concerning the dairy industry’s failure in fulfilling moral and humane 
standards for the treatment of their animals is particularly striking when juxtaposed with 
Heidegger’s understanding of society’s influence on the choices we make. His interpretation of 
authenticity allows us the opportunity to sift through and discover the morally reprehensible 
problems that constitute our everyday activities in “going along with the flow.” Authenticity 
brings out what Charles Guignon calls the “Janus-faced” properties of the world and its 
everydayness
87
: society in this case urges us to respect the mother-child bond, causing us grief 
when we see it disrespected. At the same time, we are told to nourish ourselves with milk, and in 
being representative of this bond, we fail to question it and other dairy products’ true origin. 
Instead, we trust what we are told or what we see in the media (and as I have shown, these 
images do not depict reality). Simply put, Heideggerian philosophy and his notion of authenticity 
allows us to see how we live double lives, in a sense, without questioning or noticing it: if we 
knew what happened to the animals (and their by-products) we consume, we would probably not 
want to have a hand in it. As I have discussed, the truth of the lives of cows is that they are 
stripped of the possibility to live according to their nature. In reaction, we ought to take it upon 
ourselves to limit, in any way we can, the perpetuation of this backward practice. In order to help 
ameliorate suffering, we should strive to be authentic in aligning our beliefs about the welfare of 
these animals with our actions that perpetuate the industry's poor standards. In doing so, we can 
continue to educate ourselves about dairy; find out which dairies treat their cows well; make 
changes in our choice of dairy products at the store, in restaurants, markets, etc.; urge our 
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legislators to push for better welfare standards; or engage with others about the facts of the dairy 
industry. In sum, the goal is to ultimately take it upon ourselves to be responsible for the 
suffering we may cause, and in finding that we might contribute to reprehensible practices, we 
ought to do our best to lessen our negative impact on these animals’ lives. 
1.1: Why we go unchallenged 
 We have all gone largely unchallenged when ordering a cheap, towering ice cream cone 
at Dairy Queen, buying toiletries or pharmaceuticals that contain animal products or contain 
ingredients that have been tested on animals, or attending and thus supporting a county fair 
where performing elephants have suffered most of their lives in cages. Why, then, do we nearly 
literally get away with “murder” if the evidence suggests that change is needed? 
 There are many potentially viable answers to this question of why our morally 
reprehensible, contributory actions fly under morality’s radar. Commercials portray cows as 
being raised on pastures, tricking us into thinking we are buying “good cheese” from “happy 
cows.”
88
 There is a good argument for placing blame on companies that falsify or slightly twist 
information for potential profitability. There is also a good argument blaming the United States 
government’s lack of legislative regulation on dairy and meat industries, as well as a damning 
argument concerning university funding for research that inflicts unspeakable injuries on 
animals, recklessly putting the goals of science over principles of ethics.
89
 
 However, the reality is that the truth about what goes on “behind the scenes” is quite easy 
to access in our technologically-driven age, and some of the power needed to make changes in 
the industry is gained almost as simply as changing what ends up in our carts in the supermarket. 
As the consumers of dairy products (as well as meat, pharmaceuticals, etc.) we have a personal 
barrier to overcome in order to understand and make changes that we know would contribute to 
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minimizing animal suffering. That barrier involves being responsible for our behavior and taking 
ownership of our actions. Unfortunately, we often fail at doing so. I describe this failure as the 
“inauthenticity problem.” 
1.2: The inauthenticity problem 
 The inauthenticity problem is not as simple as an argument that blames a faceless 
collective for reprehensible action against animals; it is much more: inauthenticity is both 
descriptive and prescriptive in that it accurately characterizes the phenomenon of individuals 
failing to act morally and responsibly, and also offers how one ought to go about becoming a 
meaningfully moral
90
 person. Understanding authenticity can lead us to make meaningful 
changes in our moral framework, thereby extending our moral efforts toward ameliorating 
animal suffering. Importantly, I only want to capture a certain aspect of Martin Heidegger’s 
concept of inauthenticity; I do not want to suggest that realizing authenticity with sole regard to 
animal treatment will alter every aspect of our moral lives.
91
 Rather, I suggest that we can apply 
Heidegger’s concept of authenticity to the individual’s awareness that she must come to terms 
with, specifically, her individual contribution to animal suffering. I clarify and explain this 
phenomenon throughout this and the following chapter. 
 First, I will briefly discuss colloquial or pseudo-philosophical variations of the concept, 
followed by its philosophical and Heideggerian connotations. Then, introducing Heidegger’s 
project of Being and Time and exploring the phenomenological account of “Dasein” will allow 
me to describe how his notions of existence and authenticity correctly reflect the current 
phenomenon of humans’ excessive contributions to animal suffering. I will also describe the so-
called “process” of authenticity and how one can kick-start the transformation toward 
authenticity and “create” oneself (one’s identity, role, values, etc.). Consequently, this will allow 
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me to illustrate the moral benefits of understanding Dasein’s relation to the world and to time. 
Then, I will discuss authenticity’s relation to morality and the specific values with which I am 
concerned here, including the tacit approval and subsequent contribution of dairy cow and calf 
suffering. In sum, I will have shown how Heidegger’s notion of authenticity can help to achieve 
the individual’s goal of minimizing animal suffering. In doing so, I will also show that despite 
authenticity seeming philosophically painstaking, it is in fact a quite accessible notion that need 
not require self-flagellation or an intense philosophical (re)education. Discussing authenticity 
and framing this moral problem in this way allows me to bring the long-overdue attention to the 
individual’s contribution to the perpetuation of animal use in arenas such as the dairy industry. 
The ultimate goal in solving this problem is offering a new way to look at ourselves—either as 
inauthentic or authentic individuals—which in turn will help us learn how we can make and 
sustain making the right choices concerning how we utilize animals.   
1.3: Understanding and framing the problem correctly 
 The moral problem that I have presented is best illustrated through Heidegger’s 
understanding of human existence and our relation to others. Heidegger describes us as 
individuals who act as part of a “great mass.” The heart of this illustration concerns the bedrock 
notion that the inauthentic self, referred to as the “Self of everyday Dasein,” the “they-self,” or 
the self that belongs to the “they,” is different from the authentic Self. Inauthentic Dasein 
belongs to, or is owned by, the “they” as opposed to belonging to itself or owning itself.  
 But understanding what Heidegger means by these terms and phrases is difficult given 
his mutated usages of various conceptions, some of which are so elementary (e.g., “they,” “self,” 
“belong,” etc.) that they carry with them innumerable connotations we might find difficult to 
shake. Just in terms of the core concept in this essay—authenticity—there are dozens of ways of 
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characterizing it and its opposite, inauthenticity. Before completing a descriptive account of what 
Heidegger means by authenticity, it is helpful to briefly take it out of its context, and understand 
what it does not mean. 
2: Conceptions of authenticity 
 Throughout history, authenticity or the quality of being “authentic” has varied from 
conceptions concerning, for example: truth, genuineness, autonomy, and things or persons being 
“real” or original. A sculpture can be the authentic work of an artist in the sense that the artist 
truly did produce that sculpture, and that she did not copy others’ ideas in creating the 
sculpture—it was her own, authentic, original idea. I can be genuinely sorry to my partner for 




 understandings of the concept of authenticity often concern 
becoming “a better you” or doing some “soul-searching” in order to improve oneself, often with 
the ultimate goal of being happier. These romantic and popularized notions undermine the robust 
philosophical underpinnings of authenticity, and make it seem as though one can become 
authentic in a matter of a few easy steps. Here, authenticity is reduced to a hedonistic 
interpretation that, as I will show, denies one the much more meaningful results of observing the 
philosophically-driven notion of authenticity, especially that of Heidegger. In fact, striving to 
achieve these pop-psychological or pseudo-philosophical variations of authenticity can drive one 
in the opposite direction, leading one to reassure oneself of one’s primitive or restrictive cultural 
or religious virtues, instead of cultivating potentially different, better virtues. For example, a 
Christian self-improvement regimen might maintain that one should seek tolerance of, for 
instance, Hindu or Islamic beliefs, when in fact tolerance should perhaps be seen as something 
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that opposes meaningful, genuine acceptance and appreciation for others’ beliefs. Or, on the 
other hand, a guidebook on how to be a better, more authentic mother or wife might lead one into 
reaffirming stereotypical expectations of women’s emasculated roles at home. 
 Alternatively, authenticity is also popular as a buzz-word for accepting,
93
 forgiving, and 
loving oneself, or letting go of one’s ego, and finding one’s “true” or “core” self.
94
 This 
interpretation of authenticity can lead to a dead-end: it puts one on a wild goose chase for a 
“substantial, fixed, enduring self that underlies the shifting desires, modes, relations, and 
involvements that make up a person’s life . . . [and all one finds is] a centerless swirl of transient 
relationships and events with nothing to hold them together.”
95
 Seekers of this interpretation of 
authenticity likely become confused and at a loss, perhaps unable to realize that they are looking 
for something that isn’t really there. 
 Furthermore, these ideals of authenticity that have been popularized by the media (books, 
magazines, websites) capture neither the obvious nor the subtle benefits of taking a more 
philosophical approach. As opposed to popular psychological modes of “authenticity,” 
philosophical accounts of authenticity can properly incorporate and help to explain issues in 
ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology, e.g., moral responsibility, belief justification, decision-
making, etc. Unlike psychological and pop-cultural notions of authenticity, a proper 
philosophical understanding of authenticity allows us to explore metaphysical, ethical, and 
epistemological justifications for various beliefs because of the inherent interconnectedness and 
interdependence of philosophical schools. Indeed, this interconnectedness raises many puzzles 
for authenticity’s
96
 relationship with these fields of philosophy, and though they are outside the 
scope of my concerns here, they are nonetheless important and worthy of more discussion. 
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3: Heidegger’s authenticity 
 The notion of authenticity is best understood in the context of Heidegger’s general 
project of “Being.”
97
 Heidegger saw Being as constituting an elusive issue, in part due to the 
normalcy with which we speak of Being (e.g., how we are, where a thing is, who I am, etc.). In 
other words, its meaning has become obscure due to its everyday usage, or its everydayness.
98
 
Discussing authenticity in particular requires this concurrent evaluation of Being and society and 
a close look into the actions of the individual within society, otherwise known as Dasein,
99
 and 
also what Heidegger refers to as a being-in-the-world. 
 As I previewed, the main idea is that the inauthentic self, referred to as the “Self of 
everyday Dasein,” differs from the authentic Self, the “Self which has been taken hold of in its 
own way[.]”
100
 This inauthentic Self of everyday Dasein is caught up in what Heidegger calls 
“everydayness”; he acts like and takes on the habits of others, so much so that he becomes 
essentially indistinguishable from those next to him (referred to as “Others”); in other words, 
individuals can no longer be distinguished from the crowd and everyone is essentially one and 
the same: 
In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services 
such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another 
dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into a kind of Being of “the Others,” in 
such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more 
and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of 
the “they” is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; 
we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we 
shrink back from the “great mass” as they shrink back; we find “shocking” 
what they find shocking. The “they,” which is nothing definite, and which all are, 




The result of “Dasein’s lostness in the ‘they,’” as described above, “has always kept Dasein from 
taking hold of [its] possibilities of Being . . . So Dasein make[s] no choices, gets carried along by 
the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity.”
102
 In comprehending that the Self of 
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everyday Dasein behaves as a seemingly anonymous part of this mass, we might be able to see 




 Heidegger also describes the inauthentic Self as one who is “fleeing” from the task of 
taking ownership of his own life
104
; in other words, his life belongs to the “they”: he is controlled 
not by himself, but rather, by what society expects from him in terms of what norms he must 
follow and what roles
105
 he must play as a being-in-the-world: in this way, “ . . . Dasein is 
absorbed in the ‘they’ and is mastered by it.”
106
 But to change, we cannot simply escape others. 
We exist amongst other humans, and inextricably, we have a close relationship with the world. 
But as Professor Emeritus of the University of South Florida and Heideggerian scholar Charles 
B. Guignon explains, this same world fortunately does allow for possibilities of being. In this 
way, the they is “Janus-faced”: 
 On one hand, our participation in the “they” is an enabling condition that first opens 
us onto a world and gives us the resources we need for being human. From the 
outset, Dasein draws its . . . self-understanding . . . from the way things are 
interpreted by the “they.” On the other hand, this involvement in public forms of 
life . . . restricts “the possible options of choice to what lies within the range of the 
familiar, the attainable, the respectable—that which is fitting and proper.”
107
 There 
is an inveterate tendency, then, to go along with the flow, content with “satisfying 
the easily handled rules and public norms of the “they,” and thereby being 




 In laying out these “possible options of choice” (which I discuss further throughout this 
and the final chapter) we have the pivotal to the seemingly trivial: whether or not we will partake 
in the institution of marriage, have children, or take on a forty-year career, and whether or not we 
will take the bus or the train, eat breakfast, or take a shower or a bath. Undertaking these modes 
of existence and making these various choices, we are able to choose to choose the route where 
either our choices are made for us—i.e., the route of inauthenticity, wherein we simply make 
unowned choices and default to doing what the “they” indicates we are supposed to do—or, we 
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can mindfully, meaningfully, and responsibly make those choices and take ownership for them 
as authentic individuals. 
3.1: The process involved in authenticity (Heidegger’s interpretation) 
 The general process of becoming authentic involves a few components. First I will 
describe what Heidegger understands as occurring when one makes a shift toward authentic 
being-in-the-world, and then I will describe my own take on what, generally, underlies this shift.  
 For Heidegger, it requires that one experiences anxiety, wherein Dasein is brought “face 
to face with the ‘nothingness’ of the possible impossibility of existence”
109
: “Anxiety 
individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as ‘solus ipse,’”
110
 or “alone” in the world, in the 
sense that Dasein exists only as an individual, as one’s lone self, though not necessarily 
(emotionally) lonely in any way. Another component is the confrontation with our being-toward-
death—this does not stem from a dismal, negative sense of death, but rather in the sense that “the 
roles we have been playing suddenly seem anonymous, and we are faced with the demand to 
own up to our lives”
111
 because the only thing that is certain about our lives is that they will end. 
And, if we can face the fact that we are not only beings, but finite beings (beings-toward-death), 
“our lives will be transformed[;] one [can be] pulled back from . . . everydayness.”
112
  In other 
words, we will be pulled out of the “dictatorship” of the “they”; rather than belonging to the 
Other, we suddenly see that we—and our actions—belong to ourselves. Heidegger also indicates 
that our conscience is the apparatus that can disclose our possibilities of Being, allowing us to 
“see” ourselves
113
 and therefore the ownership we have over our own lives. 
3.2: The process involved in authenticity (my interpretation) 
 What is important here is to show that Heideggerian philosophy—which may very well 
be perceived as highfalutin and confusing for the average individual—can be expressed in more 
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ordinary language. Peeling away some of Heidegger’s more esoteric vocabulary, we can relate to 
what is occurring in Dasein (in the individual): these moments of so-called “anxiety” or 
realizations of our “possibilities” essentially translate into experiencing being faced with 
indebtedness, responsibility, or guilt, or a combination thereof. This confrontation with an issue 
or problem can occur either passively, i.e., it just happens to us, or actively, i.e., we seek to learn 
about and evaluate ourselves or some issue.
114
 When we confront an issue about life itself, or 
some aspect concerning our lives like a moral issue, a life-change such as becoming a parent or 
losing a family member, etc., there is an opportunity for authenticity. When we encounter these 
moments (or they encounter us), we may very well experience indebtedness (to ourselves and 
others), responsibility, or guilt; expressed in its most accessible and simple form: we may realize 
that we are falling short of what is possible for our selves.
115
  
3.3: Inauthenticity and affected ignorance 
 We then have a choice to either strive toward an ideal, or to ignore or bury the notion; the 
latter is culpable. In other words, being faced with this option naturally opens the door to asking 
questions of right and wrong. That is, the nature of authenticity as a possibility of being opens it 
up to a discussion of blameworthiness; in being faced with the choice between authenticity and 
inauthenticity, we are inclined toward inauthenticity: the escape from having to take 
responsibility for ourselves: 
 We throw ourselves into the turbulence of day-to-day chores and they-roles in order 
to avoid facing up to something we find threatening. What we are fleeing from in 
everydayness is . . . the fact that we are finite beings and that we are ‘delivered over 
to ourselves’ in the sense of being responsible for the task of making something of 




When we confront ourselves with this fact, we can either make something of our lives (in this 
sense of having a deep responsibility to do so) or be consumed by this aforementioned 
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“inveterate tendency” to “go along with the flow.”
117
 This choice can result in a forced 
forgetfulness of the option to be responsible and make something of our lives, which in turn 
gives rise to making careless and unowned (or irresponsible in Heidegger’s sense) choices that 
can often affect others’ welfare. We can see that there is tension between the inauthentic versus 
the authentic possibility of being; if we know that continuing on the inauthentic path as opposed 
to the authentic one results in causing harm, then in choosing to “go along with the flow” we are 
making a morally blameworthy meta-choice: we are choosing to choose the option that allows us 
to look the other way, to refuse to let ourselves see how our actions contribute to harming 
others—we are essentially fleeing, as described by Heidegger and Guignon. 
 This phenomenon is akin to a concept called affected ignorance. In her apropos article, 
“Affected Ignorance and Animal Suffering: Why Our Failure to Debate Factory Farming Puts Us 
at Moral Risk,” Nancy Williams piercingly brings to light the culpability of this choice with 
particular regard to animal welfare. According to her, the general basis of affected ignorance 
involves the culpable “refusal to consider if a practice in which one participates is immoral.”
118
 
This manifests in several ways, and is apparent in various realms. For example, Williams states: 
 [P]eople admittedly avoid knowing the details of how their meat is produced. Most 
say, in effect, “If you know, please don't tell me. I don't want to hear the details 
because it would be too upsetting and would ruin my appetite.” Knowledge about 
factory farming systems and animal suffering is knowledge most people do not 
want to have. We do not want to see or hear about what transpires on most hog or 
chicken farms for we have a suspicion that this kind of information will be 




This example is particularly helpful in that it illustrates a failure of responsibility on the 
consumer’s part, showing that one has reached a fork in the particular road concerning animal 
welfare. Whereas the “societal tensions should propel one's imagination and moral curiosity into 




 I take this phenomenon to be a particular indicator of inauthenticity that 
exemplifies how we passively allow nearly ten billion agricultural animals annually and 9.2 
million dairy cows specifically to endure intense suffering and pain. 
 In sum, in revealing the differences between authentic and inauthentic Dasein, Heidegger 
brings to light a quite troubling aspect of our lived lives: that in this inauthentic, “fallen” 
existence, marked by the loss of the Self, we essentially do what everyone else does, not only 
without questioning these everyday actions, norms, or traditions, but also with particular, forced 
disregard for and ignorance about what might actually be happening behind the scenes. In this 
sense, inauthenticity even “ . . .becomes a way of life protected by custom if not by law.”
121
 This 
phenomenon has innumerable consequences, one of which is that as part of this “great mass,” we 
may perform actions and make choices that are morally reprehensible
122
; however, they are 
disguised by the “they” as such because they constitute “going through the motions” of our 
everyday lives.
123
 The key now is to understand that there is an opportunity in which one can 
shift away from the “they,” and take ownership for her actions. 
 Whether we undergo Heideggerian anxiety, or have moments of realization that spark 
change (such as in the latter experience that I have described) it is a step toward transforming 
into being authentic individuals. As Heidegger says, in undergoing this shift one is presented 
with “the ability to live with a clear-sighted grasp of the temporal continuity and future-
directedness” of one’s own life.
124
 In other words, such a transformation allows us to be able to 
understand, in a new way, the way we relate to the world and to ourselves, as well as the way we 
understand and undertake our own commitments. In turn, this transformation has numerous 
implications for how we understand the moral elements in our lives, in particular, our 
responsibility. 
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 What authentic Dasein understands is that the choices she makes belong to, and are made 
by, herself: she takes ownership of her decisions and actions, and is responsible for them (an idea 
fully fleshed out in chapter three), understanding that all of her actions contribute to her being a 
certain sort of person. “It is only through the authentic Self that one can discover which values 
matter, cultivate them in a meaningful way, act upon them and commit to them, thus adding 
purpose and meaning to the events that constitute her narrative.”
125
 She realizes that she not only 
has the ability to choose to choose
126
 a way of being, but can also choose from a variety of 
possibilities who she wants to be. In shedding light on what Heidegger means by “possibilities,” 
it is important to grasp his conception of temporality, and the benefits of this understanding: 
purposiveness and unity. 
3.4: Temporality  
 Essentially, Heidegger’s project in Being and Time was to show how “being is time.”
127
 
In particular, the meaning of being is revealed to be “primordial time.”
128
 Primordial time is 
Heidegger’s understanding of time as past, present, and future in relation to Dasein: it is the 
characterization of time as a “bringing forth of having-been-ness” in a present moment that is 
projected toward the future. Indeed, primordial time is best understood as a view of time in 
opposition to the understanding of time characterized by an “endless series of now points” that 
one watches “flowing by.”
129
 Instead, Heidegger’s view of time is constituted not only by one 
looking toward the future, but also tying in the elements of the past and present, which in turn 
contributes to its representation as an “unfolding” story. In very simple terms, Dasein ultimately 
sees its life temporally as a possibility of a number of things, but, like a story that ends, its 
utmost possibility is that of death; and, not in a negative sense, Dasein is always projecting or 




 In understanding his being as an array of possibilities (one of those being certain death), 
Dasein is able grasp his future and take control of the present, and make it his own.
131
 In doing 
so, he becomes authentic. In other words, “If our being is finite, then an authentic human life can 
only be found by confronting finitude and trying to make a meaning out of the fact of our 
death.”
132
 In grasping this possibility of death and finitude, Dasein can understand his life as an 
“unfolding” and can feel the weight of the importance of committing to being the kind of person 
he wants to be over time. In doing so, he is making the most of his projects, and taking 
responsibility for his actions.
133
 On the contrary, inauthentic Dasein is one who does not confront 
these possibilities, does not grasp ownership of his life, and does not see that he is responsible 
for making the most of the possibilities of life. 
3.4.1: Temporality gives rise to purposiveness and unity 
 Also critical to note now is that the temporal component of Dasein highlights the 
characteristic of purposiveness for the individual striving to be authentic.
134
 This aspect is crucial 
because without feeling a purpose for ourselves (i.e., that we are always reaching toward 
fulfilling our life projects) we may begin to feel disconnected or alienated from our actions. If 
our actions ultimately had no purpose, we might lose the connection to living for a reason. 
Without purpose, we might also see our lives as absurd, nihilistic, or amoral; as if morality were 
a smoke screen, hiding the chilling reality that “nothing mattered.”
135
 
 Furthermore, having purpose in one’s life gives an individual a goal or commitment to 
what “sort” of person she will be. For instance, a civil rights activist chooses various actions out 
of a spectrum of possible actions that particularly represent her commitment. That is, she will 
habitually perform actions that mold her into the sort of person she understands a civil rights 
activist to be
136
 (e.g., lead a protest, start a petition, lobby Congress) rather than habitually 
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perform those actions that oppose or impede fulfilling that vision (e.g., steal a car, go on a 
bender, or learn to play a Rachmaninoff concerto).
137
 
 Apart from purposiveness, the other notion critical to the temporal component of Dasein 
is unity: “Temporality makes possible the unity of existence.”
138
 Even though Heidegger 
primarily characterizes Dasein as existing as a “being-toward” the future, this is not to say that 
Dasein lacks a unified, cumulative characteristic.
139
 In other words, living for something 
involves not merely our future actions, but also everything we have done, are doing, and will 
do
140
 (this also meshes with Heidegger’s understanding of primordial time as past, present, and 
future in the context of the possibility of death).
141
 Without these components, the notion of a 
“narrative” or “authoring” of one’s life is lost, as is the cumulative temporal aspect of Dasein. 
One cannot make sense of an action out of context; for example, the act of stealing a candy bar 
does not suffice to reveal much about a person’s life narrative. That is, we cannot derive a full, 
unified picture without surrounding actions or experiences in the individual’s timeline.
142
 
 The concept of unity or cumulativeness is fundamental to understanding Dasein—
especially in an ethical context—because it highlights the important notion that “everything we 
do contributes to making us people of a particular sort”
143
—an idea which only authentic Dasein 
has grasped. Equally notable, and also in opposition to aforementioned pop-psychological 
understandings of authenticity, is the idea that one may always radically change the course of her 
life: she is not tethered to her narrative in the sense that she cannot change the way she acts and 
to what kind of character her actions contribute; rather, one can reevaluate, modify, or 
reconstruct her purpose and goals if she so desires (take, for example, Malcolm X, who was 
imprisoned for burglary and later became a human rights activist and American Muslim 
minister).
144
 More apropos is the former cattle rancher who became vegan and transformed her 
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ranch into a sanctuary, and began literally serenading her cattle in lieu of sending them off to 
slaughter.
145
 These experiences, viewed as a totality, emerge to form a unified picture of an 
individual’s life. 
 These temporal components of Dasein, purposiveness and unity, allow us to understand 
how one’s actions directly reflect the “kind” of person she wants to be.
146
 The crucial element of 
this is that what one does matters because her actions represent the kind of person she is and 
wants to be over time—i.e., throughout her life narrative: “One ‘is’ what one does.”
147
 We can 
also see that, as a whole and over time, the values that one holds ought to be reflected in his or 
her actions (when applicable).
148
 
3.5: “Creation” of the self 
 Importantly, one of the upshots to this understanding of Dasein’s temporality and 
authenticity in the social or community context is that instead of viewing society as a burden or a 
constraint, society is a reference that offers “patterns of action,” a multitude of idols,
149
 and any 
other materials one needs in order to try her best to live her own
150
 life well.  
 Thus, the authentic individual does not create her self from scratch; rather, being 
entrenched in the social context is what gives her the details of her own life “plot” (much like the 
details of a narrative). That is to say, being in society supplies her with the “stock of roles, 
lifestyles, and character traits” from which she can create her potential life story. For Heidegger, 
the temporality that is our existence illustrates that “we are essentially historical: we are 
members of a community that continually draws on its heritage in order to work out its 
destiny”—an interpretation that reflects Heidegger’s notion of “primordial time” mentioned 
earlier, that runs in opposition to the “superficial interpretation of time as a neutral timeline”—




 Moreover, this interpretation of Heidegger’s account recognizes the requirements of 
everyday motions (such as dropping our children off at school, making dinner for our family, 
brushing our teeth, etc.). In this sense, “authenticity is not about being isolated from others,” or 
being alienated from some requirements of living, “but rather about finding a different way of 
relating to others such that one is not lost to the they-self.”
152
 That is, one can find a balance 
between the authentic Self and potential isolation or alienation that threatens living authentically 
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 One of the most beneficial aspects of Dasein’s social embeddedness is that 
contextualizing it as such opens the door to understanding authenticity’s relationship to ethics. In 
fact, authenticity and ethics are closely intertwined, for an individual’s beliefs are often reflected 
in his actions. As Mark A. Wrathall indicates in his article, “‘Demanding Authenticity of 
Ourselves’: Heidegger on Authenticity as an Extra-Moral Ideal,” morality is indeed a domain for 
authenticity: “[A]uthenticity . . . contributes to, and is relevant to, moral distinctions[.] Whenever 
it matters to a domain that actions performed in that domain express the self, then the 
authenticity . . . of the agent will be relevant to that domain.”
153
 And as such, authenticity is 
indeed relevant to the domain of animal welfare. 
2: Authenticity, responsibility, and our role in animal welfare 
 As I have previewed, inauthentic Dasein exists in a state that Heidegger refers to as being 
“lost in the they”—we act, eat, groom, socialize, think, fear, work, laugh, cry, etc., just as 
everyone else does. But the most crucial occurrence in being absorbed in this everydayness is our 
failure to question our actions or reflect upon whether or not we would be ready to stand for, 
own up to, or justify our actions. For my purposes here, I show that inauthentic Dasein fails to 
assess whether or not she is contributing to the suffering of those beings around her, just like the 
next individual fails to do so as well. Rather, she simply sticks to the everyday motions, which 
include eating certain foods like dairy products and meat, washing her hair and body, getting 
dressed, doing her makeup, buying clothes and a slew of other products, etc. In these normal, 
everyday actions (that are expected of her and enforced by us to the extent that if she failed to 
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perform them normally, she would be outcast to some degree) there lurks the gross abuse of 
animals. 
 In the United States, for instance, the mere 3.2 percent of vegetarians
154
 have historically 
been questioned by meat-eaters about their practices as if they were aliens from another planet, 
and male vegetarians, especially, are mocked for their lack of “manliness” for eating a salad 
rather than a slab of steak. One in four Americans consume some type of fast food everyday,
155
 
and with nearly ten billion animals
156
 caught up in the factory farming system, that comes out to 
thirty confined animals per human per year. Throughout the course of these everyday actions, 
inauthentic Dasein does not consider the fact that “we are what we make of ourselves in the 
course of living out our active lives.”
157
 
 This is where Heidegger’s sense of responsibility and a more purely ethical sense of 
responsibility meet. In fact, a particularly significant feature of Heidegger’s authenticity is that it 
makes possible the opportunity for these conceptions of responsibility.
158
 In Heidegger’s sense of 
the word, responsibility—which stems from the transition from inauthenticity toward 
authenticity—is a personal phenomenon that requires Dasein to own up to its role as a social 
agent.
159
 In way, this process results in a sort of existential and moral wake-up call, as it were, 
that allows us to face issues of ownership and responsibility for our actions. For Heidegger, 
though, responsibility does not merely involve moral responsibility; it also involves an 
“indebtedness”
160
 to oneself in that Dasein owes itself its own life. For Heidegger, responsibility 
is a fundamental component of authentic Dasein, and moreover, it is only through authenticity 
that one can be meaningfully responsible
161
; otherwise, Dasein’s responsibility is not truly owned 
if it ostensibly “belongs” to inauthentic Dasein. In this sense, authenticity can, and should, “be 
regarded as a[n] ‘executive virtue’
162
 that provides the condition for the possibility of being a 
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moral agent in any meaningful sense whatsoever.”
163
 In other words, authenticity can be 
regarded as a necessary condition for providing the foundation that is required to be a moral 
agent. Another way of expressing Heidegger’s interpretation of schuld as responsibility is a sort 
of guilt that ensues when we fail to live up to our selves; when we fail to allow ourselves to 
flourish at our full capacity, moral and otherwise.  
2.1: The application of responsibility to animal ethics 
 In viewing responsibility in these ways, we can fully and meaningfully recognize that we 
are the reason that millions of dairy cows suffer needlessly, and much of it is due to our failure 
to live up to our commitments. The inauthentic both passively and actively divorce their actions 
from their beliefs: instead of owning their actions, they skirt their commitments and 
responsibilities and instead “go with the flow”—but what is really happening is that they are 
failing “to realize that what [they] are doing at this moment just is realizing the goals of living”; 
the things that we do—constantly—make us who we are.
164
 And if we carry on our business as 
usual, then we are major contributors to reprehensible physiological and emotional suffering. 
Fortunately, one of the most important potential effects of understanding this interpretation of 
inauthenticity is that it allows us the ability to grasp the fact that right now, we can focus in on 
ourselves and come to the realization that we are failing at fulfilling our potentials (referred to 
earlier as “falling short”
165
 of what we could possibly be); or likewise, in keeping with 
Heidegger’s focus on finitude, we see that in the future we may look back only to see that we 
failed at fulfilling our potential, that we could have done more, that we let ourselves down.
166
 
 We should also come to grasp (and grapple with) the notion that “[w]e are what we make 
of ourselves in the course of living out our active lives”
167
 and that any action has an impact on 
being the kind of person one wants to be.
168
 At the same time, it would be challenging to find an 
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individual who actively wants to be the kind of person who causes unnecessary suffering or 
would actively desire to see a mother and her calf separated for life.
169
 Even inauthentic people 
may even already hold the ethical beliefs and have the tools in order to make animals’ lives 
better, but as such (i.e., as inauthentic individuals) they fail to apply their moral standards to the 
treatment of animals or fail to act according to their beliefs. Simply, there often exists a disparity 
between one’s actions and one’s beliefs. As Rollin states, most people do not want to cause 
harm, or go out of their way in order to contribute to suffering, but, “if animals must be brought 
under the umbrella of moral concern and deliberation, the comfortable sense of right and wrong 
is no longer tenable, and we can no longer eat, sleep, and work in the same untroubled way,”
170
 
and this proves to many to be too difficult a challenge to face valiantly. However, as I argue, 
authenticity can help us face that challenge. 
2.2: How do we work toward becoming authentic? 
 As I have shown, authenticity is a transformative event that requires a process of 
deliberate decision-making regarding one’s values and reflection upon which actions she thinks 
will best contribute to those values and goals.
171
 When one attempts to evaluate herself regarding 
these notions, a value that ought to arise must concern the welfare of others; it is an inescapable 
facet of lived human life that we encounter everyday. Hence, her actions must demonstrate 
careful consideration of how she affects other beings capable of suffering. This means that she 
actively questions how she may be harming others, learning more about the ways she may be 
contributing to harm or suffering in a range of ways, and begin the process of phasing out, or 
altogether stopping, the actions that contribute to her harming of others.
172
 In keeping with some 
of Heidegger’s vocabulary, Guignon describes a similar process: 
 If we can take a stand on our being-toward-death, our lives will be transformed . . . 
The result is the ability to live with a clear-sighted grasp of the temporal continuity 
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and future-directedness of own’s own [life]. This lucidity leads to a way of living 
we might call “self-focusing” . . . Such directedness . . . brings about a change in 
the way we relate to . . . our being as projections into the future. We take over . . . 
[with a] decisive dedication to what we want to accomplish for our lives. And our 
stance toward the future is that of . . . a clear-sighted and unwavering commitment 
to those overriding aims taken as definitive of one’s existence as a whole. Authentic 
self-focusing, understood as a resolute reaching forward into a finite range of 
possibilities, gives coherence, cohesiveness, and integrity to a life course . . . and 




This transformation allows us to open the door to meaningful
174
 changes with regard to the way 
we see and treat ourselves and others. And if the individual is successful in adhering to her moral 
commitments, including those that decrease her contribution to the suffering of animals, she is 
moving in the right direction. Of course this involves steadfastness in one’s goals, which in and 
of itself is difficult, but authentic Dasein is fundamentally aware of her own pitfalls and 
weaknesses, and is in the best position to be able to fine-tune her actions in order to better strive 
toward reaching her goals. When she fails, she takes note of her failure, and tries harder next 
time; she can ultimately learn about herself from her mistakes. It is quite positively a mark of 
dedication. 
3: Ethical guidance/the constitution of our moral beliefs 
 There is of course the question concerning which values we ought to hold; Heidegger 
does not supply us with particular prescriptions concerning the constitution of moral beliefs, and 
moreover, merely because Dasein possesses the capability to meaningfully recognize moral 
values does not guarantee that the “correct” traits, characteristics, or moral virtues might strike a 
chord in an individual. In this case, there is a worry about which values she might idolize. 
 As Guignon states in On Being Authentic, just in case someone has developed her sense 
of self, the kind of person she wants to be, does not automatically entitle her to being authentic. 
For example, if Hannah’s commitment in her life is being an illegal drug smuggler, and she 
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devotes her life to developing the character traits that go along with that lifestyle, we might balk 
at the idea of calling her authentic. In other words, “[t]he fact that we hesitate to apply the term 
‘authentic’ in [this case and cases like it] indicates that what is crucial about authenticity is not 
just the intensity of the commitment and fervor of the expression it carries with it, but the nature 
of the content of the commitment as well.”
175
 Additionally, those individuals who are 
authentic—i.e., responsible in the sense that they recognize that they owe themselves an owned 
life that is constituted by commitments to a life project—might see those inauthentic individuals 
as “letting down”
176
 both themselves and also those who are authentic. Authentic Dasein also 
comes to see commitments and moral values as priorities, unlike those who make trivial 
commitments their priorities (e.g., finding the perfect shade of eyeshadow for every day of the 
week, or spending months trying to decide which sports car to buy). Though these commitments 
and values are many and varied, it does not follow that we cannot outline at least a few of the 
most basic values that are necessary to being truly authentic. In fact, we don’t have to go very far 
to see which values we should adopt or keep. 
 Like the aforementioned “stock” of roles and traits through which one creates herself, 
authentic Dasein herself can choose, too, the models, exemplars, and ethical values that appear 
throughout history to craft her ethics. For Heidegger, authentic Dasein “can take itself over . . . 
by repeating,” or in other words, by drawing on historical possibilities of being—i.e., idols or 
heroes—in making its life its own.
177
 Interestingly, Heidegger uses the word “revere,” showing 
that despite inauthenticity’s reign, he respects history for its possibilities of existence: “Where 
inauthentic Dasein just drifts along with the latest trends,” in looking to history, “authentic 
Dasein ‘remembers’ its rootedness in the wider unfolding of its culture, and it experiences life as 





 In turn, as Guignon states, this embeddedness in a shared history readily promotes a 
morality that highly regards the characteristics that allow for the continued success of the 
community, such as “fairness, honesty, dignity, benevolence, achievement, and so on.”
179
 In 
partnership with critical thinking, these values, among several others like discipline, empathy, 
and self-control, can help us greatly when considering, for instance, how we personally affect the 
welfare of the millions of cows caught up in the dairy industry. And though it is not pertinent 
now to explain and defend all the values we ought to hold, it is my job to both defend why 
animal welfare in particular deserves a definite place in our moral purview (which I have done in 
chapter one), and to show how it can fit into Heidegger’s model of authenticity. 
4: Heidegger, Rollin, and animal ethics 
 Concerns about animal welfare fit neatly into Heidegger’s framework. In particular, what 
animal ethicist Bernard Rollin brings to light throughout his body of work is that ethics 
concerning animal welfare need not be elusive or mystical notions; instead, they are within our 
reach: recalling Plato, Rollin argues that what is often the obstacle toward effecting change 
regarding animal treatment is simply a matter of “reminding” people of values that they already 
hold: “Plato taught us a very valuable lesson about effecting ethical change. If one wishes to 
change another person’s—or society’s—ethical beliefs, it is much better to remind than to 
teach.”
180
 In other words, we have seen that certain values prevail through time (e.g., as in the 
fight for equality and human rights). Rollin argues that moral values do not arise ex nihilo, 
rather, new “moral categories” are created from pre-existing ethical tenets: “recall that western 
society has one through almost fifty years of extending its moral categories for humans to people 
who were morally ignored or invisible—women, minorities, the handicapped, children, citizens 
of the third world.”
181
 Furthermore, Rollin states, “in Plato’s beautiful metaphor, the philosopher 
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helps you to recollect, to draw from inside of you in a clear way what you don’t realize is 
there.”
182
 In our case, the crucial point here is how Rollin applies this notion to animal treatment, 
stating that it is a natural move “to continue [to] attempt to extend the moral machinery [we 
have] developed for dealing with people, appropriately modified, to animals.”
183
  
 The trouble, though, is that even when individuals might be able to easily draw 
conclusions about animal suffering (whether they see the video the HSUS released on downer 
cattle, read Animal Liberation, or learn about veal crates), there is no guarantee that they will 
change their behavior and take responsibility to alter their own routines. What is more likely is 
that they carry on with day-to-day living, continuing to divorce their lived lives from their (new) 
beliefs. Perhaps a moved individual might donate money each month to PETA, but meanwhile, 
she continues to eat cheese or veal, drink milk, yogurt, and ice cream from unknown and 
potentially questionable sources. The missing link here is her failure to see that conclusion as a 
value that absolutely requires a self-reflective evaluation of exactly how intensely she herself is 
wrapped up in a routine of “normal” actions that in fact are laden with suffering.  
 This is where the robustness of authenticity can help: it requires that she change; that if 
she genuinely cares about animal welfare, she will take a stand, and she will recognize that her 
actions
184
 contribute to and reflect the kind of person she wants to be, which is someone who 
takes seriously the welfare of those who cannot speak for themselves. That is, authenticity and 
the following general moral obligation constitute an ideal: that our actions ought to reflect the 
kind of people we want to be. This complements and reflects Rollin’s ideal,
185
 the result of which 
is that individuals’ own beliefs draw them to their own conclusion that, essentially, animals like 
dairy cattle are on the deserving end of many of the values they already hold. For some, this 
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experience might serve as a kind of moral awakening, leading them to change the way they 
perform their day-to-day routines. 
 Moreover, in understanding temporality, purposiveness, and unity, the individual can 
grasp her life as an unfolding or a narrative, understanding that her actions are ultimately and 
only her own; it is she who buys into the dairy industry when she decides to consume or use 
products that lack transparency about the practices involved, e.g., tail-docking or crating veal 
calves. It is her owned decision to continue to eat prime veal from restaurants that do not disclose 
the origin of their meat. If she is to be concerned with the wellbeing of animals (which as I have 
shown given the state of the industry, she ought to be), she must take matters into her own hands; 
her care for animals is reflected in her choice of restaurant or her choice of a brand of milk at the 
supermarket. If she chooses to neglect the wellbeing of or actively contribute to the suffering of 
these sentient beings, she cannot live her life authentically as an individual whose beliefs align 
with her actions. And, as I have shown, she ought to care
186
 if she is not living authentically 
since authenticity can, again, be regarded as an executive virtue that serves as the foundation for 
a meaningful life. Of course, if she is in doubt about which actions she ought to perform in order 
to contribute to her narrative, she can turn to historical idols for guidance. 
 Rollin’s recognition of the importance of returning to these historical roots of a common, 
shared moral history also meshes well with Guignon’s interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of 
authentic Dasein utilizing the “wellspring”
187
 of historical exemplars and role models in order to 
incorporate certain values or characteristics into his or her set of moral beliefs, thus crafting a life 
story and drawing a picture of what kind of person he or she wants to be. We can seek guidance: 
we can look to people in the world who treat animals well, or who strive to make positive 
changes in their own lives toward animal wellbeing or who are active in making changes in the 
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dairy industry or in the various industries in which animals are abused. The examples are many, 
and though I do not pretend to exhaust the list, it is important to note a few: these include, for 
instance, Jane Goodall, who opened a world of caring, compassion, and respect for animals in 
research and apes in particular; Bernard Rollin, who has shown that compromise and dialogue 
are extremely important in making real, concrete steps toward positive changes in the animal 
industry; creators, employees, volunteers, and advocates of organizations like Mercy for Animals 
or the Farm Sanctuary; vegetarians and vegans, like Buddhist monk Thích Nhất Hạnh, and even 
celebrities such as Ellen DeGeneres, or individuals in our families who have set examples that 
show us the possibilities of living with a commitment to animal welfare; designers and 
businessmen, such as Yvon Chouinard of the company Patagonia, who has shown that on a 
global scale, we can and should make strides toward treating animals well and cause no 
unnecessary harm when we are utilizing their products in everyday textiles; and the list goes on. 
 The reasoning behind this suggestion to look toward models and exemplars is critical: 
rather than working against society’s expectations, norms, and traditions, the source of some of 
our most important ethical beliefs, like fairness, equality, respect, veracity, integrity, etc., are 
those that society has, historically, preserved and continuously applied in new ways to new 
“moral categories.”
188
 To be sure, society does tell us to drink milk of strong bones, urge men not 
to cry, and require that we respect authority; however, society also has encouraged us not to 
harm others, to respect each other whatever our race or gender, to be fair and honest in our 
transactions and promises, to avoid causing unnecessary suffering, etc.—values that aim at 
achieving a great deal of good. 
 Though it might not seem that it is the case on the surface, dairy cow and calf welfare is 
one of these issues that is well within the scope of these common values, and unfortunately, as I 
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 One of the most basic values that may be considered to help heal this moral failure is that 
when we can decrease suffering, we have the obligation to do so. And we must educate ourselves 
about our impact on others, especially those who have the ability to suffer. It should go without 
saying that part of what is integral to human life, generally speaking, is gaining knowledge about 
the world around us, and one of the most crucial elements concerning truly understanding our 
world is our impact on other people, the environment, and other sentient beings. There are 
various ways to learn about issues in our lives, and we can achieve this through several modes of 
research and debate, whether it’s learning through reading, observing, surfing the internet, or 
engaging in conversations with people with varied backgrounds and interests, we do owe 
ourselves and others the effort of gaining knowledge about the scope of our impact.
190
 
 An authentic individual
191
 who is undergoing this process of deliberate and careful 
evaluation of and reflection on her values can recognize her effects on others, put her values into 
practice, and commit herself to acting in ways that represent those beliefs, and ultimately lessen 
her role in the suffering of animals such as dairy cattle. Again, being authentic requires the 
recognition of some basic, common, historical values, and to claim authenticity, her actions 
must, in some way, represent her values and commitments.
192
 Otherwise, if she does not “live up 
to” her values and commitments, she is inauthentic.
193
 “When someone fails to deliberate about 
what is important or comes up with transparently trivial or pointless commitments, or when he 
refuses to stand for what he believes, we feel that [he is] not doing [his] part to sustain a social 






5: The power of Heidegger’s model 
 Unfortunately, Heideggerian philosophy, and his misleading and abstruse language 
surrounding authenticity, is not quite as “mainstream” as Dairy Queen. As I have also shown, the 
exact process of achieving authenticity is not quite as plain and clear as we might hope. It even 
appears that it requires a sudden realization of one’s conscience that cannot be forced—rather, 
our conscience highjacks us, in a sense. Heidegger does not give us instructions concerning 
authenticity like the thousands of books, websites, and blogs concerning pseudo-authenticity do. 
But as I have shown, we know what it takes to be authentic, and we know that this is a goal well 
worth the effort: authenticity allows a direct route to the good life. As Socrates said, “an 
unexamined life is not worth living,” and the authentic life is arguably the ultimate manifestation 
of the examined life. But is it enough to become authentic just by knowing what authenticity 
requires, or must we undergo this spontaneous bout of anxiety, wherein we suddenly feel 
anonymous and alone? 
 Though spontaneity cannot be forced, understanding the process and what it requires can 
lead us toward a transformation away from inauthenticity. The power in comprehending and 
utilizing Heidegger’s interpretation of authenticity as a framework for effecting change in the 
realm of animal welfare does not lie in potential instructions on how to be authentic, but rather, 
“its value lies . . . in providing a basis for understanding our embeddedness in a wider context of 
meaning . . . and the fundamental role of moral commitments in our ability to be humans in any 
meaningful sense.”
195
 In simply grasping that which Heidegger offers to us concerning the 
effects of authenticity and inauthenticity on our selves, we are already closer to making changes 
aimed at examining our commitments (by filtering the trivial ones), and understanding that our 
actions represent not only our beliefs but the kind of people we want to be. Being authentic 
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allows for us to view our lives as a cohesive whole, a timeline that shows our evolution, 
including our successes, and our failures. We want to see that we have grown, not that we have 
stunted our growth, or that we failed in fulfilling our potential. 
 Moreover, getting to the heart of authenticity can cause a shift in our patterns of thinking 
about ourselves and about the world. In particular, the most striking feature of utilizing 
Heideggerian philosophy for animal welfare is its strength in supporting Rollin’s notion of the 
need for a shared ideal about the treatment of animals: “[o]nly by having an ideal to move 
toward can we progress beyond the status quo.”
196
 Rollin’s concern is: 
  [that] if our ethical account of human moral obligation to animals cannot effect 
sympathetic resonance . . . in the minds, and ultimately in the practices of those in 
society to whom it is addressed, then it is of no value . . .  [O]ur ethical account 





In juxtaposing our actions with our background beliefs about how all sentient beings ought to be 
treated, we understand what role we have in the success or failure of others’ welfare, and 
ultimately, we should be moved toward effectively and fully living up to our beliefs. 
 A final strength of my argument comes from the fact that the groundwork done to reach 
an ideal for dairy cow welfare is one rooted in both phenomenology and also moral philosophy. 
Heidegger’s phenomenological account in Being and Time allows for a natural talk of ethical 
obligation: if a large part of being authentic is being responsible for one’s life and owning up to 
one’s actions, one must consider the content of what one stands up for when it comes to owning 
up to one’s actions. And this is where we can insert and apply the shared ideal for our moral 
obligation to these animals. As Rollin has shown, this ideal is brought about through the process 
of reminding ourselves of the values that we already hold and applying those beliefs to a new 
category: animals. Thus, in making this shift toward authenticity and reflecting upon and 
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shedding new light on some of our already-held ethical beliefs, we can elucidate our own moral 
failures concerning animal welfare, and strive toward following through on our commitments. 
6: Discussion 
 In the following I will present and reply to some major objections. 
6.1: Objection one: authenticity is alienating 
 The first major objection concerning authenticity is that it is alienating. It could be 
claimed that living authentically does not allow us to perform normal actions that are needed to 
simply get through the day. In this sense it seems that authenticity is a self-imposed isolation in 
various social situations that might require us to act in opposition to our own goals we have for 
ourselves. For instance, in performing those actions that are necessary to doing practical things, 
like attending to our financial matters, being polite to our doctor, or being congenial and eating 
the cheeseburgers and ice cream that our neighbors are serving at a cookout, we tend to get 
“caught up” in human life. Heidegger calls this “being-in-a-situation” that contributes to being 
wrapped up in the “dictatorship” of everydayness that I have mentioned throughout this essay. 
6.1.1: Reply 
 What is crucial to grasp is that though some tasks are necessary, they are necessary 
because they play such an important part in allowing one to achieve a much more important and 
meaningful life goal. That is, the everyday actions that one performs contribute to, or are means 
to, his predominant end of being the sort of person he wants to be. And the authentic individual 
is one who does not merely mindlessly perform those actions (again, the inauthentic individual is 
one who does so), but rather recognizes those actions as the everyday tasks that they are. In other 
words, he is crucially aware and essentially cautions himself that those actions are everyday 
actions in the Heideggerian sense. He is also aware that they lead him to live a life (a 
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“possibility”) he chooses to live. He recognizes that at the heart of these customary routines, he 
can freely choose to follow through with them but acknowledges that they do not contribute to 
being the kind of person he wants to be (though, if he wants to be the kind of person who can be 
malleable in various situations, then he can easily fulfill that goal as well). For example, being a 
good dog owner might require that Sally occasionally engage in conventional, everyday small 
talk with other dog owners at the dog park, but this allows her dog the social interaction he 
requires in order to be happy (and closer to fulfilling his telos). Importantly, this need not require 
that she be trapped in everydayness; in fact, her recognition shows that she understands her 
relation to the world. The same applies to those who are, for instance, cordial in situations where 
they are offered a gift or food (e.g., a leather purse, a Thanksgiving turkey, etc.) and oblige rather 
than harm the gift-giver or host’s feelings. (I also describe this in more detail in my replies to the 
following objections.) 
 Moreover, with regard to changing our own habits and ways of life in order to achieve 
better dairy industry standards, options exist, and they are not alienating. Vegan alternatives are 
growing in popularity in both restaurants and supermarkets, and some producers of dairy 
products such as the members of the Coulee Region Organic Produce Pool (CROPP) have very 
high standards that represent their opposition to practices like tail-docking, and urge that a nerve-
block must be utilized for dehorning that takes place past an age of sixty days.
198
 They also have 
various benchmarks for housing, bedding, lighting, hygiene, transportation, electric gates and 
prods, air quality, etc.
199
 Ultimately, choosing the products that come from reliable and 
trustworthy sources can shift the demand for better quality products that represent high standards 
of dairy cattle welfare. 
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 Of course, some of these options come with one caveat: cost. Not everyone can afford a 
six-dollar gallon of milk to feed their growing children, or afford to spend more than a couple 
dozen dollars on several packages of American cheese to put on their burgers for a fourth of July 
party. The cheap supermarket or gas station options remain tantalizing in their low cost. 
However, with an optimistic eye toward the future, many individuals as consumers can change 
the demand by avoiding dairy and eating more fruits and vegetables. In 2014, for instance, 
vegetarians and vegans played a part in the 400 million fewer animals that were killed for 
food.
200
 Though it constitutes a small dent in the nine to ten billion animals caught up in food 
production every year, if the trend continues to rise, vegetarian, vegan, and more ethical dairy 
options will likely respond proportionally in cost. And those who seek to be the sort of people to 
cause no unnecessary harm can rest a little easier, knowing that their choices are becoming more 
accessible, and that their lifestyles are no longer isolating them in ways that greatly affect their 
budget. 
 Finally, we need not work alone in the quest to lessen our impact on the suffering of 
animals such as dairy cows. Many others are working in various arenas in order to find the best 
ways to strike balances between the efficiency of meat and dairy production, our desire to 
consume meat and dairy products, and the welfare of the animals that provide these products. As 
I mentioned in chapter one, for example, The Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal 
Production put forth their report entitled, “Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal 
Production in America” in 2008 which concerned “food animal production and its impact on 
public health, the environment, animal welfare, and rural communities.”
201
 In this report, they 
advocate many recommendations with the goal of “ensur[ing] that the system is able to provide 
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safe, affordable meat, dairy, and poultry products in a sustainable way” while meeting, and 
continuing research on, the social, physiological, and medical needs of animals.
202
 
6.2: Objection two: authenticity involves an excessive time requirement 
 Another objection to this interpretation of authenticity is that it is overly ambitious in 
virtue of the overwhelming time requirement it poses.
203
 Constant reassurance that one’s tasks 
are contributing to his “being a certain sort of person” requires perpetual mindfulness of one’s 
actions: “The constant preoccupation with [the] self cuts you off from others, breeding 
competition, aggressiveness, envy, alienation, and ultimately despair.”
204
 On the face of genuine 
authenticity, every action—brushing one’s teeth, paying the cashier at the grocery store, going to 
a boring movie your kids are begging you to take them to see—seems like it would require a sort 
of intervening thought, that: “I am performing, or should perform, action x because it is 
contributing to my life-goal.” This kind of time requirement that is dedicated to the focus on 
authenticity and constant reminding of oneself of his life story easily adds up when performing 
everyday actions, and therefore, might in and of itself begin to take time away from being the 
person he wishes to be. In the end, this constant mental preoccupation might lead him to despise 
the authentic way of living and revert to a kind of hatred for his life projects.
205
 
 Susan Wolf highlights a similar concern in her article, “Moral Saints”; namely, that one 
can become so concerned with doing the right thing all the time that she loses sight of her other 
projects: “[T]he desire to be as morally good as possible is apt to have the character not just of a 
stronger, but of a higher desire, which does not merely successfully compete with one’s other 
desires but which rather subsumes or demotes them.”
206
 More apropos is the sense of well-
roundedness she proposes that moral sainthood would disallow: “[T]he moral virtues, given that 
they are . . . all present in the same individual . . . are apt to crowd out the nonmoral virtues, as 
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well as many of the interests and personal characteristics that we generally think contribute to a 




 The answer to dealing with the potentially overwhelming time investment that 
authenticity and morality seem to require can be mitigated a couple ways. Part of the answer is 
built-in to the notion of authenticity itself; authentic individuals (of the Heideggerian sort) look 
to those roles and characteristics of others who are successful in their pursuits. For example, if 
one looks to his family members or friends to see what kind of parent he wants to be, he finds 
that the good parents balance their lives between upholding their commitment not only to their 
children, but also to their partner in marriage, their careers, or their commitments to themselves 
and their own particular projects. One of the traits of successful people is their ability to avoid 
being overwhelmed by these commitments. In other words, being constantly preoccupied with 
living authentically is not what makes these people successful; rather, it is the balance with 
which they live their lives. Their commitments and their basic needs are in harmony with each 
other, and this need not mean that they are constantly being mindful of all of their actions; rather, 
they are aware of their projects and promises, and understand that they must find equilibrium 
amongst their pursuits. 
 A similar proposition can be found in philosopher Peter Railton’s essay entitled 
“Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.” In his essay, he essentially 
proposes that one need not be engaged in a constant moral calculus in order to be moral.
208
 
Instead, we keep ourselves in check, occasionally taking a moral inventory to make sure that our 
decisions and actions align with our beliefs. Authenticity and morality “need not alienate us from 
the particular commitments that make life worthwhile.”
209
 Instead, we live our lives being aware 
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of the goal, but not dwelling on it. He draws an analogy to a tennis player
210
: a successful tennis 
player is not constantly thinking about winning; if she were, she would likely lose for she would 
not be able to concentrate on the next serve or the next volley. The successful tennis player is 
mindful that each shot she takes will get her closer to her ultimate goal, but understands that a 
preoccupation with the trophy is foolish. Likewise, a tightrope walker knows he must not reflect 
upon keeping his concentration,
211
 lest he wants to end up on the ground. Instead, the individual 
striving to be authentic might “develop standing dispositions to give more or less time to 
decisions depending on their perceived importance, the amount of information available, the 
predictability of his choice, and so on.”
212
 An individual who is cultivating authenticity is one 
who appropriately understands, incorporates, and allocates time concerning his various 
commitments. Eventually, he may also form new habits or responses to certain situations—that 
is, mindfully crafted habits or responses that are manifestations of a great deal of introspection 
and reasoning that have risen from a transformation toward authenticity. 
 Susan Wolf’s own answer in fact resembles the authenticity approach. She calls it “the 
point of view of individual perfection.”
213
 Essentially, it is based on the assertion that we should 
each do that which makes each of us unique, rather than being entirely driven by morality alone, 
becoming moral automatons who lack senses of humor, style, or quirks. And morality constitutes 
only a portion of the total picture; personal projects and goals might not always overlap with the 
concerns of morality, and vice versa, and it is important to “develop our characters and live our 
lives in certain ways.”
214
 
 Like Wolf herself, I essentially employ a pluralist approach
215
 such as the one advanced 
by Thomas Nagel: our lives are constituted by an amalgam of moral (and nonmoral) values, and 
these values may sometimes conflict to form dilemmas. For instance, the pluralist recognizes that 
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commitments to one’s family may override commitments to the greater good (or vice versa) or 
commitments to one’s own personal projects (playing a violin concerto or finishing a painting) 
may override commitments to a friend (or vice versa).
216
 Simply put, we are often presented with 
situations wherein we must choose between competing values, some of which may also be non-
moral. Authenticity allows us the ability to strike a balance amongst these values by utilizing her 
point of view of individual perfection; that is, with an eye toward being the sort of person she 
wants to be. 
 Putting forth an ideal of authenticity is not to say that we need to be perfect in constantly 
aligning our actions with our beliefs. Even if a perfectly moral act has never been done, it ought 
not keep us from striving for a goal or from promoting moral theories. Likewise, authenticity 
might not ever be fully achieved, but that notion alone should not restrict us from advocating it 
(consider Kant’s advancement of, as well as the continuing support for, his categorical 
imperative). With that being said, one of the important aspects of authenticity that I have 
highlighted is the flexibility it allows us to mold our lives, as we try to find a balance between 
self-flagellation and perfection, and deal with dilemmas. 
6.3: Objection three: authenticity is a fanatical, extreme, or radical ideal 
 Authenticity is too elusive, esoteric, and extreme to be considered an ideal that is 
understandable, practical, useful, and applicable. Because of this, trying to connect with others 
over an important moral issue (such as animal welfare) may seem futile if the ideal is too 
extreme or difficult to grasp or reach. 
6.3.1: Reply 
 The average person who stands next to you in the grocery store queue probably does not 
have a good grasp on Heideggerian philosophy. Indeed, Heidegger is difficult to understand, and 
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some philosophers devote their lives to interpreting his ideas and unique vocabulary. However, 
just because he utilizes idiosyncratic or superficially misleading language should not keep us 
from seeking answers. Scientists know that there are indeed easy “answers” to many complex 
and difficult problems: appeals to a higher being, for instance, would eliminate the cost and 
painstaking years of research done to understand black holes and evolution, for example. But 
many find these kinds of solutions unsatisfying in their alleged ability to “explain” phenomena. 
 In our case, authenticity as a model or tool would help solve a pressing moral issue, but it 
is unappealing in that it is indeed difficult to access, especially in virtue of its tough shell of 
Heideggerian idiosyncrasies. But the struggle to grasp Heidegger ought not keep us from seeing 
how useful his model is. He provides us with an understanding of the world in which we live, 
shows us that once we take a step back and examine our lives, we may not be living up to our 
own standards, and provides a tool that can serve as a foundation for living well. 
 Moreover, if there is one conclusion to take away from a moral perspective on 
Heidegger’s notion of authenticity, it is a simple one; essentially, our choices make us who we 
are. This is not superficially extreme—it is quite a simple realization. The groundwork does 
indeed involve rather esoteric and elusive ideas, and each word has a great deal of importance 
and foundational labor behind it. But it has been my job here to remove the thorns from the rose, 
as it were: to deconstruct and elucidate difficult passages in order to render them palatable and 
practical. Likewise, the conclusion (that our choices and actions constitute the kind of people we 
are) is there in a pure, relatable, and useful form for others to comprehend, accept, and observe. 
 In reply to the objection that authenticity itself in an ideal that is unattainable, I reply that 
indeed, it is an ideal. Like those who practice Buddhism, reaching enlightenment or “awakening” 
is an ideal, but it is not often attained. Knowing this, nevertheless, does not inhibit those who 
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practice; rather, they are focused on the moment. Likewise, authenticity serves as a lodestar, a 
guide, and we must concern ourselves not with perfection but rather with practice. We strive 
toward ideals daily, and we often do not reach them; we might even make the same New Year’s 
resolution year after year, and various forces can keep us from reaching our goals, whether they 
are out of our control or not. The most important thing to keep in mind is that in between intense 
self-criticism and perfection, there is a middle ground in which we find balance among the 
various limitations that hamper achieving our vision of our selves. Utilizing authenticity in the 
ways I have proposed should help us understand and focus in on our lives in such a way that 
allows us to find that middle ground; being a good guest at a dinner party and being a vegan who 
avoids drinking milk or eating veal may tug and pull at each other, but it need not put us in a 
position in which we have to tip the scales out of the favor of authenticity; authenticity can, 
instead, help us in situations where a conflict arises. 
 Again, this is because determining which choices we ought to make is not difficult: the 
aforementioned “wellspring” of models and lifestyles (especially when paired with Nagel’s 
pluralism) supplies us with reasonable conclusions when we reach dilemmas, and understanding 
authenticity helps us acknowledge that dilemmas (such as those concerning animal suffering) 
exist in the first place. Simply, we need not reach far in order to understand how to strive toward 
authenticity. This helps to bring home authenticity and the complexity of the notion itself, rather 
than seeing it as something that exists as transcendental, idealistic, and challenging to 
understand. 
7: Conclusion 
 As I have shown, milk and the mother-offspring relationship carry with them images of 
wholesomeness, growth, health, and feelings of comfort. One of the things that we have 
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historically found disturbing and saddening is the premature removal of the child from the 
mother, or the murder, kidnapping, or loss of a child. Interestingly, however, we do not seem to 
think about how we may individually be affecting the emotional capacities and teloi of the 
mother and her calf, as well as their health issues and social restrictions. With very little 
difficulty, by accessing information on the internet, in books, or other media, we can educate 
ourselves on how we affect each of their natures as well as their bond, which is, rightly so, 
special and strong, as I have elucidated. 
 The disruption of this relationship as well as the abuse surrounding the animals involved 
is something that we could, if we examined our own lives, actions, and commitments in such a 
way that this interpretation of Heidegger proposes, cease in contributing to and also help 
improve. Effecting change in the area of these animals’ welfare is not something to be done only 
by dairy owners, lawmakers, or organizations—it is something for which we ourselves ought to 
take responsibility, especially because many of the beliefs we already hold run in opposition to 
the actions that we perform that promote the poor welfare of these animals (e.g., consuming 
dairy products from unknown or questionable sources). Heidegger’s notion of authenticity allows 
us to put ourselves in the position where we can enlighten ourselves, understand, and change our 
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